United States District Court (March 18, 1992) Western District of Texas-Austin Division, W.O.F. v. Attorney General, Civil No. A-92-CA-089, U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks renders the decision:
<On January 13, 1992...the Attorney General of Texas sent to the Plaintiffs, by facsimile transmission, a demand for documents....Both the nature and extent of the documents demanded were not reasonable and included documents clearly the Attorney General was not entitled to obtain from any religious organization and/or church.
The church...clearly had First Amendment rights to assert....Now, after the filing of this lawsuit, the Attorney General admits its demand for documents...and its petition in quo warranto were inappropriate....
The Court finds from the evidence that the conduct of the Attorney General and his personnel...was neither professional nor responsible, bordering on the unethical and constitutes "bad faith." This conduct is not what is expected of attorneys charged with the responsibility of being the legal representatives of the State of Texas.
It is beyond dispute freedoms of religious worship and of association are foundation pillars of our country....For generations Americans have died and been persecuted defending these specific rights.
In this particular case, the Attorney General of the State of Texas has utilized its own interpretation of a statute...to publicly accuse a church of fraud and demand documents clearly constitutionally protected.
The accusation and demand for documents and records are enforced by pleading in quo warranto requesting dissolution of the corporate church, appointment of a receiver to manage its affairs, and an Injunction against its ministers from conducting the business of the church which is admitted (by stipulation) to be a bona fide religious organization.
These circumstances satisfy, in this Court's judgment...the conduct of the Attorney General as "bad faith, harassment or any other unusual circumstance that would require equitable relief"...
The Court finds from the evidence that the Plaintiffs have established that their declining to deliver the records and documents demanded by the Attorney General was an exercise of legitimate and valid First Amendment rights, i.e. constitutionally protected.
Contributors to the church do not seek to purchase goods or services. Plaintiffs do not advertise goods or services for sale. Contributors to the church are not required to give donations in order to receive pamphlets, books or other goods. Nor is a donation required before [someone] will pray over a prayer request or perform other acts.
There is nothing to make contributors to the church believe their
contributions are in return for requested materials or acts by the church... In fact, not only do members sometimes make "vows" or contributions without requesting any materials or acts to be performed...but the church makes it a practice to inform persons who seek to "purchase" items that the church no longer sells anything....Contributors to the church are not "consumers," and the
Attorney General may not bring a DTPA action to protect their interests....
The Attorney General demanded, amongst other things...[a] list of all persons who have sent contributions to the Church...including name, address, telephone number, amount and date of contribution....The scope and substance of these requests are clearly unconstitutional.
The State has no constitutional authority to know a person's membership in or support of any church. The State has no constitutional authority to know what a person believes, how he or she practices religion, or how he or she supports religious activities.
Nor does the State have constitutional authority to probe into the internal operations of a church....The First Amendment right to freedom of religious belief and freedom of association protects this kind of information.
Implicit in these First Amendments freedoms is privacy of belief and association....Disclosure of who belongs to a group or who contributes to a group, and how much, has been vigorously safeguarded by the United States Supreme Court....The Court has recognized that disclosure to the public, or to the State, of a group's members or contributors can harm the group by subjecting them to harassment or causing new members to not join for fear of disclosure or harassment or other reprisal.
In order to withstand attack under the Establishment Clause, three requirements must be met:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion....
Plaintiffs' pamphlets, advertisements, television broadcasts, sermons, etc., would be subject to inspection and approval by the Attorney General.
Certainly this continual monitoring of the Plaintiffs' activities by the Attorney General would constitute an excessive entanglement....
This would also require the Attorney General to make determinations as to which representations are purely religious and which are secular. The Assistant Attorney Generals assure this Court they can distinguish purely religious assertions from secular assertions....Despite the Assistant Attorney
Generals' confidence, this Court does not believe they or any other state officials are authorized to make those kind of determinations.
See e.g. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-06, 60 S.CT. 900, 904 (1940) (state could not give a state official the power to determine if a solicitation was for a religious cause or not); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618-19,91 S.Ct. at 2114 ("With the best of intentions such a teacher would find it hard to make a total separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine").
It is simply not the business of courts or the State to "approve, classify, regulate, or in any manner control sermons delivered at religious meetings" or other forms of religious expression. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 526, 527, 73 S.Ct. 526, 527 (1953)....
The Attorney General sought forfeiture of [the church's] charter and dissolution of the corporation and appointment of a Receiver to take possession of the affairs of the [church], to rehabilitate, reorganize, conserve or liquidate the affairs of the corporation and sought a permanent Injunction against the [church], its officers, directors, stockholder, agents, employees, and representatives whomsoever from conducting any business of the [church]....
Application of these remedies to the Plaintiffs is clearly unconstitutional.
It is absurd for the Attorney General to think that it can deprive the Plaintiffs of their rights to freely worship as a group altogether as punishment for the Plaintiffs initial assertion of their First Amendment rights to not produce constitutionally protected documents....
A fine for exercising one's First Amendment rights would clearly be unconstitutional....Imprisonment would also clearly be unconstitutional, both as a punishment for exercising one's constitutional rights and because it would wholly prevent...exercising an important part of their religious beliefs, which is to spread their religious faith to others.
The Attorney General argues that because Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code includes a corporation operated for religious purposes the Church is a charitable entity. This Court disagrees. A church is not organized for a "civic or public purpose." If the Legislature had intended to incorporate any entity described in the Internal Revenue Code...it could have easily done so.
The church is not a charitable trust, and because jurisdiction in the Travis County Probate Court is based on the church being a charitable trust, that jurisdiction is improper....
The Attorney General cannot, in turn, use allegations of fraud as a sword to violate the Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights....
Article 1396-2.23A specifically exempts a religious institution from having to maintain, and make available to the public financial records "with respect to all financial transaction of the corporation"....
The Attorney General of Texas, is permanently enjoined from pursuing further its...demand for documents and investigation.> 1992US004
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American Quotations by William J. Federer, 2024, All Rights Reserved, Permission granted to use with acknowledgement.
1992US004. William J. Federer, American Quotations (2014). United States District Court, March 18, 1992, Western District of Texas-Austin Division. United States District Judge Sam Sparks, W.O.F. World Outreach Center Church, Inc., a Church non-profit Texas corporation, R.G.T. and M.P.T., Plaintiffs v. Dan Morales, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Texas, Defendant, Civil No. A-92-CA-089. See also: Supreme Court of Texas, No. D-3902, R.G.T. (individually and [sued as allegedly] D/B/A R.G.T. Ministries, W.O.F World Outreach Center Church, Inc. (a dissolved corporation), and W.O.F. World Outreach Center Church, et al.) v. The Honorable Eric V. Moye Judge, January 20, 1994, On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Justice Spector delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Justices join: "The Relators in this mandamus proceeding complain of a trial court order requiring production of documents in response to two separate discovery requests. As both discovery requests, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering production....We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production of the documents at issue....Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus relief.-Rose Spector, Justice. Opinion Delivered: February 2, 1994."